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FALL 1965]
HOW AND BY WHOM MAY AN OFFER
BE ACCEPTED?*
By W. J. WAGNERt
I.
WHO MAY ACCEPT AN OFFER?
A. In General
THE UNIFORM RULE in the United States is that the offeree
is the only person who has the power of acceptance of an offer.
This power may not be assigned by the offeree to any other person.'
The rule is thus expressed in § 54 of the Restatement: "A revocable
offer can be accepted only by or for the benefit of the person to whom
it is made," the words "for the benefit" covering contracts in which
the offeror is asking for a consideration from a person other than
the offeree. The act or promise of that person is an acceptance.2
"It is . . . elementary that an offer to contract is not assignable; it
being purely personal to the offeree."3 And if a third person learns of
the offer and attempts to substitute himself for the off eree, his endeavors
will be ineffectual.' Behind this rule there is the idea that offerors
have "the right to determine with whom they would contract, and
no other person [can] accept the offer and bind them without their
consent. . . .The minds of the negotiating parties must meet on the
identity of those to be bound before there is an enforceable contract."'
Of course, in "impersonal" contracts the offeror may be indifferent
as to the person with whom he deals; but even in this case, the
purported acceptance of a third person should be understood as a
counter-offer to which the original offeror must give his assent; and,
in the absence of such an acceptance, the contract will not be con-
summated, unless the original offer was made to the public rather
* This article is based on reports, prepared by the author for the Cornell Law
School Project on General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, and
published here with the permission of that Project. Concerning the nature of .the
comparative research undertaken by the General Principles Project, which is supported
by a Ford Foundation grant, see SCHLESINGER, The Common Core of Legal Systems -
An emerging Subject of Comparative Study, in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND
CONFLICTS LAW - LEGAL ESSAYS IN HONOR ov H. E. YNTEMA (1961) 65 ff.
t LL.M., 1939, Univ. of Warsaw, J.D., LL.M., 1953, S.J.D., 1957, Northwestern
University, Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. 1 CORBIN, CoNTRACTS § 56 (1950, Supp. 1957).
2. Id., Comment a.
3. Federal Land Value Ins. Co. v. Mitchell, 211 Cal. 77, 293 Pac. 619, 620 (1930).
4. Ibid.
5. Aurora Gasoline Co. v. Coyle, 174 F. Supp. 331, 336 (E.D. Ill. 1959).
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than to a named offeree. This approach is connected with the rule
that in order to be valid, the acceptance must not deviate from the
offer in any way; and to have a third person accept the offer amounts
to varying its terms.6
In former times, when every contract was said to be based on
strictly personal relations and the mutual duties and obligations could
not be assigned in any way, this result was obvious. But once the
ideas of assignability of contracts and of substituted performance have
been adopted, it might seem that similar ideas could be made applic-
able to offers as well. However, the courts were unwilling to accept
this approach. And they are very strict. A guaranty given to a
partnership cannot be accepted by a corporation even though the
members of the corporation are identical with the partners of the
partnership,7 and a corporation cannot be substituted for its president
as the acceptor.'
Nor can the offeree be forced to enter into a contract with a
person he did not contemplate as the offeror. Thus, if a corporation
making an offer has reason to know that the offeree believes it to be a
different corporation with a similar name, it cannot treat the offeree
as bound if he accepts because of his mistake.' This situation borders
on the problem of the "reality of consent."
If the offeror proposes to an offeree to enter into a unilateral
contract, and the performance is impersonal, the offeree can accept
the proposal by causing a third party to perform and assigning to him
the consideration. However, even in this case, the mere assignment
of the power to accept the offer is not permitted, although Corbin
thinks that this may be the law of the future.Y
Of course, offers may be accepted by agents of the offerees; "and
even if one who accepts, purporting to be such an agent, is not
authorized by the offeree so to do, his act may be ratified.""
B. Can the Acceptor be Ignorant of the Offer?
In direct dealings between two parties it is hardly possible to
accept an offer without knowing about it. But in the case of offers
to the public, and sometimes of other offers calling for unilateral con-
tracts, it may happen that a party who does not know about the
offer performs according to its terms. Is a valid contract made?
The Restatement answers this question in the negative: "§ 53. Neces-
6. Id. at 337. Routzahn v. Cromer, 220 Md. 65, 150 A.2d 912, 915 (1959).
7. Jordan-Marsh Co. v. Beals, 201 Mass. 163, 87 N.E. 471 (1909).
8. Strauss & Co. v. Berman, 297 Pa. 432, 147 Atl. 85 (1929).
9. Nutmeg State Mach. Corp. v. Shuford, 129 Conn. 659, 30 A.2d 911 (1943).
10. CORIN, op. cit. supra note 1.
11. RtSTAEMENT, CONTRACrS § 54, Comment b (1932).
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sity for Knowledge of Offer. The whole consideration requested by
an offer must be given after the offeree knows of the offer." And
in the Comment to this section, it is stated that "[i]t is impossible
that there should be an acceptance unless the offeree knows of the
existence of the offer." Again, § 23 of the Restatement requires "that
the offeree should know that a proposal has been made to him." This
rule represents the prevailing view.
C. Assignability of Options and other Irrevocable Offers
The rule of non-assignability is inapplicable to offers which were
given for a consideration and constitute contracts called options, and
those which are a part of some other contract. Today, valid contracts
may be assigned, and assignability applies also to options, as it is
not "forbidden by statute or public policy."' 2 Of course, in no contract
can the assignor free himself from obligations arising under it, unless
the other party to the contract gives his assent. Similarly, the optionee
cannot, by assigning his power of acceptance, get rid of any obligations
which the option contracts may impose on him.'" The assignment
itself, however, may be effected without consent of the optionor.
Until recently, irrevocable offers not amounting to option con-
tracts were very rare in the United States; the device of the seal
was not frequently resorted to. According to some authority, such
irrevocable offers should be treated the same way as revocable ones, and
thus made non-assignable. However, by virtue of the prevailing rule,
"[a] right which is conditional or arises from an irrevocable offer
is not for that reason incapable of effective assignment,"' 4 and firm
irrevocable offers are assignable just as options. However, there seem
to be no reported cases on this point. The requirement of the seal
to make a written offer irrevocable was eliminated in Pennsylvania,
by the adoption of the Uniform Written Obligations Act,' 5 and New
York.'6 On a more limited scale (only if made in writing by merchants
12. Cochran v. Taylor, 273 N.Y. 172, 7 N.E.2d 89, 92 (1937). There is, however,
some authority to the contrary. For details and citations of cases, see 1 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 76 (6th ed. 1963).
13. WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 12, § 418. However, in most jurisdictions, the
creditor obtains a direct right against the assuming party. Even in other jurisdictions
"it seems probable that in equity the obligation undertaken by the assignee ... may
be enforced by the non-assigning party to the original contract." The assignor then
becomes a surety and "the assignee the principal debtor." Ibid.
14. RESTATEM4NT, CONTRACTS § 155" (1932). And an illustration to this section
reads as follows: "A gives B an option under seal by which A promises to convey
Blackacre for $10,000 on receipt of that amount within thirty days. B can make an
effective assignment of his conditional right."
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 33 §§ 6-8. No other state enacted this Uniform Act.
16. § 33(5) of New York Personal Property Law, enacted in 1941 and amended in
1944, provides as follows:
When . . . an offer to enter into a contract is made in a writing signed by
the offeror .. .which states that the offer is irrevocable during a period set forth
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in sales transactions) offers were permitted to be declared irrevocable
by the Uniform Commercial Code 17 which already has been adopted
by the majority of the states. The assignability of such offers is subject
to doubt. Until now, there is no authority on this point.
D. Offers to the Public
It clearly appears from the discussion above that the offeror
has an unconditional right to select the person or persons with whom
he wants to deal. Of course, he may be willing to enter into a con-
tract with anyone who can furnish to him the consideration requested,
or anyone from a class of persons to whom a proposal is directed.
This is the situation in the case of offers made to the public. But
if the purported acceptance is made by a person not falling within
the class contemplated by the offeror, there is no contract. Thus, an
abettor of a crime is not within the class to whom the offer of
reward was addressed, and cannot recover." The same is true as
to sheriffs and other ministerial officers, acting within the scope of
their duties. Again, if a promise is made to workmen, by the words:
"Go back to your work, and I will see that you are paid," it cannot
be understood as an offer which can be accepted by subcontractors
for whom the laborers worked. 9 Generally speaking, a valid con-
tract is made by the acceptance "by any one coming within the descrip-
tion of the class."
20
II.
WHAT IS A VALID ACCEPTANCE?
A. In General
In order that a contract be created, an offer must be validly
accepted. There is no contract if plaintiff's evidence shows an offer
with all its terms, but there is no proof of acceptance whatsoever.2 '
or until a time fixed, the offer shall not be revocable during such period or until
such time because of the absence of consideration for the assurance of irrevocability.
When such a writing states that the offer is irrevocable but does not state any
period of time of irrevocability, it shall be construed to state that the offer is
irrevocable for a reasonable time.§ 279(4) of New York Real Property Law is analogous.
17. § 2-205. Firm Offers. An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed
writing which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not
revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated
for a reasonable time, but in no event may such period, of irrevocability exceed
three months; but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree
must be separately signed by the offeror.
18. Clinton County Com'rs v. Davis, 162 Ind. 60, 69 N.E. 680 (1904).
19. Indianapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Luther Miller, 71 Ill. 463 (1874).
20. Martin v. Fretwell, 202 Okla. 204, 211 P.2d 529, 533 (1949).
21. McDonald v. Berwick, 51 Mich. 79, 16 N.W. 240 (1883).
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A qualified acceptance is equivalent to a rejection of the offer and
works as a counter-offer. "The party making an offer may require
the offer be accepted by the offeree without variance."22 A purported
acceptance which includes a condition not specified in the offer is
not an acceptance at all. Thus, acceptance must be unconditional.
Conditional acceptances are nothing but new offers.23 In some states,
the rule is embodied in statutory provisions. Thus, in Foster v. West
Pub. Co., 4 the court cited § 916, Rev. Laws 1910 of Oklahoma:
An acceptance must be absolute and unqualified, or must include
in itself an acceptance of that character, which the proposer can
separate from the rest, and which will include the person accept-
ing. A qualified acceptance is a new proposal. 5
And Article 1806 of the Civil Code of Louisiana provides as follows:
The modification or change of the proposition is, in all respects,
considered as a new offer, and the party making it, is bound by
the acceptance in the same manner as if the original proposition
had been made by him. 6
It follows that "an acceptance burdened with some condition that
was not included in the original offer constitutes a new offer that
might be accepted or rejected by the original offeror as he sees fit."2"
The Civil Code of Georgia provides in § 20-108: "The consent
of the parties being essential to a contract, until each has assented to
all the terms the contract is incomplete ... 2 Under this Code it
has been held that even a small variation from the offer in the pur-
ported acceptance prevents the formation of a contract. Thus, an offer
to sell and deliver five bales of cotton during the month of September,
and ten bales in October has not been validly accepted by the offeree
who agreed to the proposal, asking that five bales be delivered on
September 4th, and ten bales on October 2nd.29  The Field Civil
Code has a provision to the same effect.30
It follows that a contract cannot be validly entered into before
an unconditional acceptance of the offer which is a condition precedent
to the existence of the contract.31
22. Aurora Gasoline Co. v. Coyle, supra note 5, at 336.
23. CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 82.
24. 77 Okla. 114, 186 Pac. 1083 (1920).
25. Id. at 115, 186 Pac. at 1084.
26. LA. Rev. STAT. art. 1806 (1951).
27. Vordenbaumen v. Gray, 189 So. 342, 347 (La. App. 1939).
28. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Supp. 1963).
29. Timmons v. Bostwick, 141 Ga. 713(1), 82 S.E.2d 32 (1914).
30. CAL. CIVIL CODz § 1585 (1954); MONT. Rtv. CODE § 13-321 (1947); N.D.
CENT. CoDe § 9-03-21 (1959); S.D. Conz § 10-0320 (Supp. 1960). The Oklahoma
statute, cited in text supra is identical with, and was modeled after, the relevant
provision of the Field Code.
31. Rothstein v. Edwards, 94 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1937).
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In § 52 of the Restatement, the very definition of acceptance is
"expression of assent to the terms thereof made by the offeree in a
manner requested or authorized by the offeror," 2 while § 60 reads
as follows:
A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which adds
qualifications or requires performance of conditions, is not an
acceptance but is a counter-offer."3
And § 58 provides that "[a]cceptance must be unequivocal in
order to create a contract," 4 while § 59 adds that it "must comply
exactly with the requirements of the offer, omitting nothing from the
promise or performance requested. '3'  Acceptance must comply with
the offer in all details. The offeror may "dictate" not only the terms
of the bargain, but also the manner in which the offeree should accept,
the time of acceptance, its place, and so forth. A purported acceptance
changing one of these details will not be treated as unqualified. But
often the real problem will be whether a part of the offer should not be
understood as a mere suggestion, that is, as to the manner of acceptance,
rather than a condition.
The person of the offeree is a material term of the offer; there
is no valid acceptance if a lease was requested to be executed in another
name.36 "Certainly the identity of the parties to a contract is as impor-
tant to a meeting of the minds as any other term upon which the
parties must agree. ' 3 7
However, there may be an unconditional acceptance of an offer
pursuant to the terms of which the offeree's promise is conditioned
on the happening of some event. Thus, there is a valid contract if
the offeror proposes to defray the offeree's prospecting expenses in
Alaska in consideration of the latter's promise to repay $10,000 if he
finds ore worth that much, and the offeree accepts the proposal.38
An unconditional acceptance does not lose its validity by the mere
fact that the acceptor indicates that he is not quite satisfied with
the bargain, that the contract is hard upon him, and that he expected
a better deal. In Mall Tool Co. v. Far West Equipment Co.,3 9 the
court said: "We can agree that Far West was never happy about
the modification, but it never refused to accept it, and it is our view
32. RE:STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 52 (1932).
33. Id., § 60.
34. Id., § 58.
35. Id., § 59.
5. Pollhainus v. Roberts, 50 N.M. 236, 175 P.2d 196 (1946).
'7. Aurora Gasoline Co. v. Coyle, supra note 5, at 337.
.2c. o . op. cit. supra note 1, § 83, n.99, at 265.
,'. 45 :.;. 2f] 158, 273 P.2d 652 (1954).
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that there was a reluctant acquiescence."" ° And Pollack on Contracts,
cited in Johnson v. Federal Union Surety Co.,41 stated:
An acceptance may be complete, though it expresses dissatisfaction
at some of the terms, if the dissatisfaction stops short of dissent,
so that the whole thing be described as a 'grumbling assent'.4 2
B. Statements without any Effect
Very often, the important question will be the interpretation of
some communication of the offeree rather than what the applicable
rules of law are. Many statements of both negotiating parties are
ambiguous. Answers of the offeree may amount to acceptance, accep-
tance plus additional statements, mere rejection or rejection and a
counter-offer. In the two latter situations, the original offer lapses.
But some other statements may have no legal effect whatsoever. Thus,
in the early case of Mactier's Adrn'rs v. Frith,43 the offeree's reply:
"I shall delay coming to any determination till I again hear from
you. . . .", supplemented by some reasons for taking this attitude,
was held not to prevent the offeree from making a valid acceptance
later.44
Again, once an unqualified acceptance is given, the contract
will be valid in spite of the fact that the offeree added "immaterial
words" to his assent.45 If acceptance is mixed with other statements,
the problem may be whether words expressing acceptance can be
separated "from the rest" and amount to an unqualified assent, as
indicated in the Field Code and Oklahoma statute.46
In general, a counter-offer has the effect of a rejection of the
original offer. However, if "the offeree in his counter-offer states
that in spite of the counter-offer the original offer shall not be termi-
nated," his subsequent acceptance will be valid.4 7
C. Immaterial Variances Between Offer and Acceptance
The requirement of unconditional acceptance was mitigated, in
some cases, by the idea that "[i]mmaterial variances between the
offer and its acceptance may be disregarded. 4 8 This approach is a
40. Id., 273 P.2d at 655.
41. 187 Mich. 454, 153 N.W. 788 (1915).
42. Id., 153 N.W. 792.
43. 6 Wend. 103, 21 Am. Dec. 262 (N.Y. 1830).
44. CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 82.
45. ELLIOTT, CONTRACTS § 37 (1913).
46. See supra page 99.
47. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 38 (1923).
48. Kaw City Mill & Elevator Co. v. Purcell Mill & Elevator Co., 19 Okla. 357,
360, 91 Pac. 1022, 1023 (1907).
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reflexion of the old principle: de minimis non curat lex. However,
the courts are very prudent in applying it, and cases where it was
expressly adopted are few. In Bushmeyer v. McGarry,45 an offer to
sell land asked that the abstract of title be left in a bank, and the
letter of acceptance provided that the abstract should be sent to the
purchaser. The seller sent it according to the vendor's wishes, and
then endeavored to avoid the contract on the ground of the variance
between the offer and the acceptance, so that the latter constituted
a counter-offer to which assent was necessary. The court held that a
valid contract was entered into, saying:
It is true the letter of acceptance introduces a change in details.
. . . Now, that was not a substantial change in the terms, but
merely a detail which the defendant promptly acceded to by
forwarding the abstract as requested. It was not such a change
as amounted to a qualification of the original offer. °
While it is possible to say that the terms of the offeree were
accepted by performing the contract according to his wishes, the court
expressly applied the idea that trivial variances between the offers
and acceptances will not vitiate the validity of the contracts.
In Small Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co.,51 the orders con-
tained no designation of the place from which the sugar was to be
shipped, while the acceptances named New Orleans as the place. The
defendant's assertion that this was a material variance was said by the
Supreme Court to closely approach " a mere quibble." Another asser-
tion was recognized as stronger (the orders gave the refiner a condi-
tional right to supply such grades of sugar as it might have available
at the time of shipment, while the acceptances omitted the words of
condition and made the right absolute), but the Court held that a
valid contract was entered into, relying on the fact that "[t]he orders
and acceptances were both prepared by the refiner - a circumstance
strongly suggesting they were intended to be in accord."52 A similar
result was reached in another case,53 in which the holding seems to be
the following: the addition, in the confirmation of the offer, of the
words "option of routing reserved to seller," is immaterial since "[t] he
seller had a right to send by the usual route."54 Thus, this "immaterial"
addition should be understood not as a real variance with the offer,
but as a term which was implied in the contract.
49. 112 Ark. 373, 166 S.W. 168 (1914).
50. Id. at 374, 166 S.W. at 169.
51. 267 U.S. 233 (1925).
52. Id. at 236.
53. Milliken-Tomlinson Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 9 F.2d 809 (1st Cir. 1925).
54. Id. at 813.
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The Uniform Commercial Code, which professes abhorrence of
technicalities and aims to render the conclusion of contracts easier,
did not overlook the point. Its 1962 version, slightly different from
the earlier versions but having the same purpose in mind, has the
following provision, entitled: Additional Terms in Acceptance or
Confirmation:
A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different
from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms."'
Clearly, the Code departs from the traditional approach. Trivial
variations between offer and acceptance could be disregarded even
under the traditional view, but any other discrepancies ruled out the
formation of a contract. The Code speaks about any "differences"
without qualifying the term in any way. Since conflicting terms do
not become a part of the deal, while the others ripen into a contract,
it was observed that cases will arise in which without agreement on
material terms the parties may still be told that a valid contract was
entered into between them - a result perhaps not wanted or antici-
pated by either of them at the end of the negotiations. Some other
criticism of the above provision of the Code was also expressed.5
In New York the courts were traditionally very strict in their
requirement that the acceptance be exactly conforming to the offer."
The leading case was Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co.,58 in
which the acceptance of an offer, agreeing to all its terms but containing
an additional request for acknowledgment of its receipt, was held
ineffective. Although lower courts continued to use this strict
approach down to the present time, the New York Court of Appeals
relaxed the rule in Valashinas v. Koniuto.5 A few years later,
influenced by the liberal view of the Uniform Commercial Code, the
New York Law Revision Commission took up the problem. It found
that there was need for legislation as it "would tend to remove
uncertainties,"6 and recommended a provision which was adopted by
the legislature and enacted in 1960, under the title: Immaterial
Variance Between Offer and Acceptance. It reads as follows:
55. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoD § 2-207.
56. However, it should be read together with the next paragraph; see infra Sec. F.
57. Niw YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N LEGISLATIVE DOCUMENT 65C (1960).
58. 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915).
59. 308 N.Y. 233, 124 N.E.2d 300 (1954).
60. See supra note 57.
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An expression of acceptance of an offer to make a contract to
sell or a sale of goods, including an offer to buy goods, shall
not be insufficient as an acceptance of the offer merely because
it states additional or different terms which do not materially
vary the terms of the offer unless the acceptance is expressly
made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms.
Where the expression of acceptance is not insufficient as an
acceptance of the offer, the additional or different terms which
it states shall be deemed an offer for addition to or modification
of the contract."'
From the wording of this provision as well as from Legislative
Document 65 C, it appears that the primary objective of the drafters
was to save the contracts in which the acceptor should be understood
as agreeing to the proposal and making additional requests, but its
caption and text indicate that it will also have the effect of disregard-
ing trivial variations between the expresssion of intention of both
parties. Submitting its recommendation to the legislature, the New
York Law Revision Commission explained:
Where the additional or different terms do not materially vary
the terms of the offer, and the offeree has not expressly made
his acceptance conditional, recognition of the acceptance as suffi-
cient notwithstanding the immaterial variance accords with
common practice and business expectation.
62
The strict approach was condemned on the ground that "it left
many agreements, which both parties had assumed to be binding,
subject to avoidance when one of the parties found that subsequent
events made performance against his own interests. '6 3
The new enactment applies only to contracts for the sale of
personal property, where the problem is "especially acute"; but clearly,
the problem exists in every contract, and the possible effect of the
legislative enactment is that it may influence the New York courts
to take a more liberal approach also in other situations, even though
the Law Revision Commission anticipates, at the end of its report,
that a "discrepancy between New York rules of offer and acceptance
for contracts of sale and those for other contracts" may have been
established. 4
Much more clearly than with respect to acceptances of offers,
the maxim de minimis non curat lex appears in connection with the
61. N.Y. P4RS. PROP. LAW § 84a (1960).
62. See supra note 57.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
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performance of contracts. In some types of contracts, such as building
contracts, the courts are willing to permit a rather wide discrepancy
between the terms of the contracts and their satisfaction, under the
doctrine of substantial performance. In other cases, and particularly
in sales contracts, they are stricter, but still the maxim de minimis
is applicable. In questions of conformity of the acceptance with the
offer the approach is still much stricter.
Some immaterial terms of the offer, however, may be understood
as mere suggestions on the part of the off eree. Section 61 of the Restate-
ment states that "[i]f an offer merely suggests a permitted place, time
or manner of acceptance, another method of acceptance is not pre-
cluded. ' '65 The comment to this section explains that "frequently in
regard to the details of methods of acceptance, the offeror's language,
if fairly interpreted, amounts merely to a statement of a satisfactory
method of acceptance, without positive requirement that this method
shall be followed."'66 The offeree's acceptance will be valid whether
he followed the offeror's suggestions or not.67
D. Terms Implied in Fact
The Restatement provides as follows:
... [A] n acceptance ... is not inoperative as such merely because
it is expressly conditional, if the requirement of the condition
would be implied from the offer, though not expressed therein.6"
Thus, a court held that there was a valid contract where
acceptance, requiring prompt cash payment and a reasonable time
for removal of the lumber, "added nothing to the contract." The
offer itself implicitly contemplated prompt payment; and "the law
would allow a reasonable time for removal of the lumber."69
The same view is taken in the states in which legal rules have
been codified. Reaffirming the principle that in order to ripen into
a contract, an offer for the sale of real property must be unequivocally
accepted, a California court held that if the acceptance simply made it
clear what the offer impliedly included, a valid contract was concluded.
Thus, where the offeree accepted an offer for the sale of real property,
adding that the sale included oil and mineral rights, the acceptance
65. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 61 (1932).
66. Id., comment A.
67. WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 12, § 76.
68. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 60, comment (1932).
69. Byford v. Gates Bros. Lumber Co., 216 Ark. 400, 225 S.W. 929 (1950).
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was valid, the offer being silent on that point and not indicating that
those rights were to be excluded from the sale, and a contract was
created. No change of its terms was made. ° In other words, the
acceptance must in every respect comply with the offer to be effective,
but it does not have to be phrased in identical language.71
E. Terms Implied by Law
Illustration 2 to § 60 of the Restatement reads as follows:
A makes a written offer to B to sell him Blackacre.
B replies, 'I accept your offer if you can convey me a good
title.' There is a contract.
This is a classical example of a condition which is implied in fact
as well as by law in every sales contract, be it in transactions involving
real or personal property. Non-compliance with the condition renders
the defendant liable both at common law and under statutes. 72 There-
fore, by spelling out, in the acceptance, a term which as a matter
of law is understood to be a part of the offer, the off eree does not
qualify the terms in any way. In Richardson v. Greensboro Warehouse
& Storage Co., 78 the court said (as a dictum) that "it is implied in
a contract to convey land, unless differently agreed, that the seller
must give a good title ;' 7' and in Townsend v. Stick,7 5 it was stated
"that it is implied in a contract to convey land . . . that the vendor
will give a marketable title. ' 7'  The rule is thus expressed:
It is generally implied, in the absence of an express provision in
the contract to a different effect, that the vendor in a contract
for the sale of real estate will convey a good title, which is
generally defined as a marketable title. .... 77
This seems fair enough. However, in some older decisions, a
contrary approach was taken. The words: "[P]rovided the title is
perfect" were held to have added a condition vitiating the acceptance
in Corcoran v. White,7' and in Warner Elevator Co. v. Guthrie,7 9
70. Martin v. Baird, 269 P.2d 54 (Cal. App. 1954).
71. Schreiber v. Hooker, 114 Cal. App. 2d 634, 251 P.2d 55 (1953).
72. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 13; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-312; SALES OF
GOODS ACT § 12.
73. 223 N.C. 344, 26 S.E.2d 897 (1943).
74. Id. at 346, 26 S.E.2d at 899.
75. 158 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1946).
76. Id. at 144.
77. 49 Am. JUR. Specific Performance § 95 (1943).
78. 117 Ill. 118, 7 N.E. 525 (1886).
79. 12 Ohio CC. 182 (1896).
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the same effect was given to the simple words: "[A]ccepted, title
to be good."
If there is a small addition in the acceptance, the offeree risks
to have his assent qualified as conditional. How can the offeror prove
that his title to the real estate is good? Either by exhibiting to the
offeree a policy of title to the land, or by handing him over an
abstract of title to be examined. The courts are not unanimous as
to the treatment of an acceptance in which the offeree is asking for
such documents. The problem may hinge either on a small difference
in the wording of the acceptance, or on the approach of the particular
court.
Such an addition may be understood either as being implied in
the offer, or as being a supplementary request, or else as amounting
to a rejection of the offer and constituting a counter-proposal.
The first view was expressed in Townsend v. Stick."° The court
stated that "all that was suggested was an examination of title to
determine its merchantability," which was anyhow "implied". Again,
acceptance is valid if it adds that the occupants of the premises which
are being sold should be given a reasonable time to vacate. The
occupants are entitled to a reasonable time to move out whether the
contract is specific on this point or not."'
The second approach was taken in Kreutzer v. Lynch. 2 The
question was how to understand the following words: "Your option
• ..is hereby accepted. Please forward deed and abstract of title to
the ...Bank ... , with instructions to the bank to let us inspect
the papers, and if the title is found perfect, to deliver to us on payment
of $6,000.00." The court found that the acceptance was unconditional,
followed by "a suggestion and request." ' On substantially similar
facts, in Brearley v. Schoenings4 the holding was that there was no
valid acceptance. The qualification "if" appeared in both cases, but
in the Lynch case the offeree stated: "Option accepted," while in
the other he said: "I will close with you." Some courts state that
the general rule is "that the seller is not required to furnish an abstract
of title unless he specifically contracts so to do.""5 In the Richardson
case,"8 the court explained:
[I]t is not implied in law, or, as far as we know, required by
any controlling custom, that attorneys of plaintiff's selection
80. See supra note 74.
81. Cavender v. Waddingham, 5 Mo. App. 457 (1878).
82. 122 Wis. 474, 100 N.W. 887 (1904).
83. Id. 100 N.W. at 887. See also Holt v. Stofflet, 334 Mich. 272, 54 N.W.2d
593 (1952).
84. 168 Minn. 447, 210 N.W. 588 (1926).
85. Mehler v. Huston, 57 So. 2d 836 (Fla. 1952).
86. See supra note 72.
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should be designated to pass upon the title, and that their adjudica-
tion thereon should be final, and possibly have the effect of
annulling the contract.
And the court treated the prospective purchaser's request as an "intro-
duction of a material condition affecting the transfer and acceptance
of the title, not contemplated by the offer." Therefore, it "amounted
to a counter-proposal."
No valid acceptance was held to have been expressed in Phoenix
Iron & Steel Co. v. Wilkoff Co. 7 The accepting telegram read as
follows: "We accept option, and hereby purchase . . . 15,000 tons
. . . , it being understood that we have the right to have our inspector
at loading point as material is shipped. Acknowledge receipt of this
message." The court pointed out that the right to inspect the goods
is recognized by the law even without any agreement on this point,
but that the right of the buyer to inspect at any place other than at
the destination of the goods is not well settled, and it "may be injurious
to the seller in delaying him in shipping the goods, if not otherwise. '"88
Had the court stopped here, its decision would not seem to be con-
troversial. The court, however, proceeded to compare the case at bar
with the more usual situation, saying that if the offeree had assented
to the offer, adding the observation that he will be entitled to an in-
spection, the acceptance would be valid, the right to inspect being
given him by the law. But when he "expressly qualifies his acceptance
by making it a condition thereof that it is to be agreed that he is
to have a right to which he would have by law been entitled," 9 his
assent will be treated as qualified and the contract will not be formed.
It does not seem that this distinction is sound.
There are quite a few other cases, however, sustaining the prop-
osition that if the offeree requires from the offeror an acknowledge-
ment of his acceptance, the latter will be vitiated and treated as a
counter-proposal.9 °
F. Additional Requests
If acceptance is clear and unconditional, the contract is made even
if the acceptor simultaneously makes some new propositions, requests,
or other offers. The addition to the acceptance may not have the
effect of making it conditional. Thus, a sales transaction is complete
if the offeree expresses his assent to purchase some real property in
87. 253 Fed. 165 (6th Cir. 1918).
88. Id. at 175.
89. Id. at 170.
90. WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 12, § 77, n.6.
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accordance with an option, and also proposes to buy some personalty. 1
And an offer by a deceased's heir to pay a debt owed by the deceased
when succession is settled is validly accepted even if the offeree makes
a request to pay right away in the words: "I appreciate your attitude
...and of course we would not mind waiting .. .for the settlement
of the estate. However, if it is possible for you to secure the funds
necessary to liquidate the note at this time, we would both appreciate
it . ."."" The acceptor's reply to the offer "may go beyond the terms
of the proposal without qualifying the acceptance." Then the court
will have to consider what the offeree intended and what the offeror
"ought to have understood," examining "the situation and purpose
of the parties, and the subject matter and course of the negotiations.'"
An additional request to "ship tomorrow if possible" clearly will
not vitiate the validity of the acceptance.94 The idea is thus expressed
in § 62 of the Restatement:
An acceptance which requires a change or addition to the terms
of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is
made to depend on an assent to the changed or added terms.
When prospective purchasers of real estate accept an offer and
ask for an abstract of title, the acceptance may be understood as
unconditional, the alleged variance with the offer being only "a
mere request, which defendants [are] free to grant or refuse."9
And an offer to sell some land for cash is validly accepted although
the off eree adds to his assent: ". . . attach draft to deed and send to the
...Bank . . , and I will take care of same," the addition being not
an "unagreed-upon condition," but "a mere suggestion to expedite
the consummation" of the contract. 96
Podany v. Erickson takes a similar approach. The court stated
that it was
...well settled that requested or suggested modifications of the
offer will not preclude the formation of a contract where it
clearly appears that the offer is positively accepted, regardless
of whether the requests are granted.97
In the instant case, said the court, the defendant had no legal duty
to furnish an abstract; however, its furnishing was not made a condi-
91. Ackerman v. Carpenter, 113 Vt. 77, 29 A.2d 922 (1943).
92. Vordenbaumen v. Gray, 189 So. 342, 347 (La. App. 1939).
93. Purrington v. Grimm, 83 Vt. 466, 470, 76 Atl. 158, 159 (1910).
94. Simpson v. Emmons, 116 Me. 14, 99 Atl. 658 (1917).
95. Holt v. Stofflet, 334 Mich. 272, 274, 54 N.W.2d 593, 594 (1952). See also
Kreutzer v. Lynch, supra note 80.
96. Skinner v. Stone, 114 Ark. 353, 222 S.W. 360, 361 (1920).
97. 235 Minn. 36, 49 N.W.2d 193, 194 (1951).
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tion of the deal by the plaintiff. It was just a "request or suggestion,"
and "not a qualification of the acceptance of the offer." Therefore,
plaintiff's letter of intention to purchase was held to amount to "an
unconditional acceptance" as a matter of law.98
Additional terms in the acceptance ordinarily do not have the
effect of preventing the creation of a contract under the provision
of the Uniform Commercial Code.99 Section 2-207(2) of the 1962
version of the Code provides as follows:
The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addi-
tion to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part
of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them
is received.
The effect of this provision is to make the area of acceptances by
silence much wider than under traditional rules.
Before New York adopted the Code, it was influenced by some of
its provisions, and particularly the ones quoted above. As a result,
§ 84a of the Personal Property Law was enacted in 1960.100 One
of the effects of this provision is that additional terms in the acceptance
will not necessarily prevent the formation of a contract. If an agree-
ment as to the bulk of the bargain is reached, the deal amounts to
a valid contract, provided the additional terms of the acceptor do
not materially vary the offer. His answer thus does not amount
to a rejection of the offer, but to an acceptance supplemented by an
offer to agree on still another point or points, or a request to modify
some terms of the contract which may be accepted or rejected by
the original offeror.
If the acceptor clearly does not condition his acceptance on the
new terms proposed by him, similar results can be reached in the
absence of a statute, even in situations in which the agreement of
the offeror to the offeree's request would substitute a new contract
for the previous one. Thus, in Johnson v. Federal Union Surety Co.,'0
the acceptance was held to be valid in spite of the fact that the acceptor
expressed the hope that the other party would be more liberal, writing:
98. Ibid.
99. UNIVORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207(1) ; see supra.
100. See supra note 61.
101. 187 Mich. 454, 153 N.W. 788 (1915).
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"We are still expecting that you will agree to pay us $3,333.33 ...
I would appreciate very much receiving your check for this amount,
or if your company is not willing to go along on this, we would thank
you to send us the amount pledged by you of $2,500. ' 02
Sometimes, acceptance and requests of the offeree for a better
bargain are so much connected with each other, that the decision
whether acceptance was unconditional may be difficult. In Bleeker v.
Miller,'0 3 the acceptor objected to some provisions of the offer and
expressed the opinion that the offeror should not ask for such condi-
tions. However, the court found that the acceptance was valid and
only supplemented by a request for a favor which the seller was free
to grant or refuse.
G. Method of Performance
Where the offer has stated some specific time and place of per-
formance, an acceptance stipulatirg a change of the method of per-
formance will not be recognized as unqualified. And if time and place
of payment are not specified in the offer, the seller is entitled to be
paid in cash. "It [is his] legal, right to have the money paid to
[himself], and at [his] place of abode."' 4 The buyer "has not the
right to change the place of payment where he attempts to accept
an offer, and ...an acceptance of this kind is not an unqualified one
such as is necessary to make a binding contract."' 0 5
The usual approach was well explained in Rahm v. Cummings :106
The telegram and letter . . . purporting to accept her offer,
directed her to 'send deed in blank to Merchants' National Bank
for collection.' We cannot regard this as a mere suggestion. It
was a direction, and it imposed new conditions not found in the
terms of the offer. It required the transaction to be closed at
Detroit, Minn. . . . Unless otherwise, agreed, defendant was
entitled to have the transaction closed where she lived . .. She
did not live in Detroit. . . .The answer to defendant's offer
was not unqualified, but conditional. It was not, therefore, an
acceptance of the offer, but was in effect a rejection of it.'
The addition of the terms of payment to the acceptance was held
by the court to amount to a "direction," invalidating the assent. Why
was it not understood as a mere request with which the other party
102. Id., 153 N.W. at 790.
103. 40 Okla. 374, 138 Pac. 809 (1914).
104. Cram v. Long, 154 Wis. 13, 142 N.W. 267, 270 (1913).
105. Ibid.
106. 131 Minn. 141, 155 N.W. 201 (1915).
107. Id., 155 N.W. at 202.
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could comply or not, but which did not render the acceptance ineffec-
tive? A similar acceptance was held valid in Skinner v. Stone.'
It is largely a question of construing the answer to the offer. It
seems that "some courts may be too ready to interpret words of
'request' as making the acceptance conditional."' 9
Any terms as to the method of performance, other than those
concerning time and place, are dealt with in a similar manner.
H. Orders Subject to Approval
Customers who sign orders solicited from them by salesmen do not
accept but just make offers if the orders are subject to approval by
the salesmen's principals. Therefore, even if the word used by the
customer is "Accepted," he may revoke his assent to the transaction
before it is accepted by the seller."'
108. See supra note 94.
109. CORBIN, op. cit. supra note 1, § 84.
110. Id., § 82.
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